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DRAWING LINES IN THE AEGEAN
ABSTRACT

This paper aims to analyze the greatest problems of the
compound Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey, namely
the delimitation of territorial waters, legal entitlement of some
Aegean Islands, and delimitation of their respective continental
shelves. This article analyzes the nature of each dispute and
potential solutions in light of previous international adjudications
on similar disputes. Greece and Turkey both have different
approaches for the dispute. Greece regards the dispute as a legal
issue while Turkey regards it as a diplomatic issue and insists on
diplomatic measures only for the resolution of the dispute. The
differences in the Parties approaches have made the issue even
more complicated. For this reason, referral of the dispute to an
arbitral tribunal is the best solution for lasting peace in the area
and adherence to equitable principles. Additionally
circumstances particular to the dispute can be considered in the
context of international treaties. In case Greece and Turkey fail to
agree on inter-state arbitration, the best alternative would be
mediation by the U.S. and/or NATO. The U.S. and NATO have
neutral positions vis-à-vis the Aegean dispute, and they will both
benefit from the resolution of this ongoing conflict.
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INTRODUCTION

Greece and Turkey are two littoral states that neighbor the Aegean
Sea. The physical proximity of these two nations, as well as their historical
and cultural relationship, has resulted in many serious problems pertaining
to international law. Though the Parties have come together numerous
times to reach an agreement on these matters, the conflict in the region
continues to create an increasingly tense atmosphere day by day. The
preeminent disputes are those regarding maritime delimitations in the
Aegean. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, some of
the main problems in the Aegean are delimitation of territorial waters and
the continental shelf, and the legal status of some islands.1 Greece owns
more than two thousand islands in the Aegean and some of them are within
five miles of the Turkish coast.2 Obviously, Greece has a great interest in
these islands regarding national sovereignty and security. On the other
hand, the islands geographical proximity to Turkish shores has security
implications for Turkey, as well.3
A potential legal instrument for solving the dispute, the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter UNCLOS), came
into force in 1994.4 While Greece is a party to the Convention,5 Turkey
did not ratify the Convention,6 even to date. The conflict between Greece
and Turkey escalated in 1995 when Greece ratified the Convention.7
UNCLOS provides for the right to territorial waters up to twelve nautical
miles.8 Turkey claims six nautical miles of territorial waters in the Aegean
Sea and has been strongly opposing any Greek claim larger than six

1. The Outstanding Aegean Issues, THE TURKISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
https://www.mfa.gov.tr/maritime-issues---aegean-sea---the-outstanding-aegeanissues.en.mfa [https://perma.cc/V9TF-PXAQ] (last visited Sept. 9, 2021).
2. Michael N. Schmitt, Aegean Angst: A Historical and Legal Analysis of the GreekTurkish Dispute, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 15, 17 (1996).
3. Id.
4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
5. See id., Participants, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%
20II/Chapter%20XXI/XXI-6.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/GE69-LG5C].
6. Turkey was one of the four states that originally voted against UNCLOS in 1982,
along with Israel, Venezuela, and the United States. MYRON H. NORDQUIST & CHOON-HO
PARK, UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA 592-93 (1983).
7. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 15.
8. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 3.
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nautical miles.9 For this reason, Turkey interpreted the ratification of
UNCLOS by Greece serious enough to regard it a casus belli.10
The Aegean issue is indeed a compound problem. The most urgent
conflicts are the dispute are over territorial waters, which is addressed in
Part II; the legal entitlement of some islands, islets, and rocks, which is
addressed in Part III; and the delimitation of the continental shelf, which
is addressed in Part IV. Inter-state arbitration, and in case that fails,
mediation by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), would be the most suitable methods for permanent settlement of
the dispute. These conflict resolution methods are addressed in Parts V and
VI, respectively. These methods would result in a fair and equitable
outcome for both Parties considering that all diplomatic and judicial
attempts have been unsuccessful.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Establishment of Greece
After the fall of Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1453 by the Ottoman
Turks, Turks and Greeks lived together for almost four centuries.11 In the
19th century, Greeks started demanding their independence from the
Ottoman Empire.12 As the Ottoman Empire declined, Greeks were able to
secure more land in the Aegean.13 However, even at the end of the 19th
century, many Aegean islands, as well as northern Greece, were still under
Turkish control and possession.14 The 20th century brought Greece more
control over the Aegean. After the Balkan wars, Greece was able to
maintain control over many of the islands in the East Aegean as well as
Macedonia, Crete, and most of the Greek mainland.15 In 1923, the
Lausanne Treaty of Peace (Lausanne Treaty) was signed in Switzerland.16
The Lausanne Treaty fixed the border between Turkey and Greece in
9. Nevin Asli Toppare, A Legal Approach to the Greek Continental Shelf Dispute at
the Aegean Sea 22 (March 2006) (A Masters Thesis on file with the Bilkent University
Library Repository System).
10. Reuters, Greek Vote on Aegean Keeps Turkey Worried, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1995,
at A7.
11. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 20.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 21.
16. Lausanne Treaty of Peace, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11. This is the peace treaty
signed between Turkey and the Allied Powers.
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Thrace, and Anatolia was granted to Turkey and the eastern Aegean
islands of Lemnos, Lesbos, Samos, Chios, and Ikaria were granted to
Greece.17
During World War II, Turkey remained neutral until the very end days
of the war despite the motivating efforts of the Allies, while Greece
entered the war on the side of the Allies.18 The Paris Treaty of Peace (Paris
Treaty) ended the war between Italy and the Allies in 1947.19 This same
treaty also influenced the borders in the Aegean Sea. By the Paris Treaty,
Greece was awarded the Dodecanese Islands which lay very close to the
Turkish coast.20 The following years were considerably stable in the region
with the accession of both Greece and Turkey into NATO in 1952.
However, the tension sparked again with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.21
B. The Cyprus Invasion
One of the relatively recent and still ongoing conflicts between Greece
and Turkey is the Cyprus invasion. The Mediterranean island of Cyprus
was purchased by Great Britain from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 and
annexed formally to Great Britain during World War I.22 Great Britain
granted independence to Cyprus by the Zurich Agreement in 1959.23 The
majority of the population on the island was Greek, but the Turks held a
substantial minority.24 The President of Cyprus was a Greek Cypriot while
the Vice President was a Turkish Cypriot, and 30% of the seats in the
Parliament were reserved for Turkish Cypriots, which balanced the rights
between the majority and minority populations, and their representation.25
Shortly after the Zurich agreement was struck, several vocal groups of
Greek Cypriots started advocating for political union with Greece.26 In
1964, a Turkish invasion was narrowly prevented by then U.S. President
Lyndon B. Johnson.27

17. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 21.
18. Scott Keefer, Solving the Greek Turkish Boundary Dispute, 11 CARDOZO J. INTL &
COMP. L. 55, 57 (2003).
19. Paris Treaty of Peace, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245, 49 U.N.T.S. 3.
20. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 22.
21. See Erhan Bora, Cyprus in International Law, 6 ANKARA B. REV. 27, 37 (2013).
22. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 22.
23. Zurich Agreement of 1959, Feb 19, 1959, 164 Brit. & Foreign State Papers 219.
24. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 22.
25. Id. at 22 n.23.
26. Id. at 22.
27. Id.
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In 1974, a coup on the island changed everything. President
Archbishop Makarios III fled to London and was replaced by Nikos
Sampson, who was a vocal advocate for union with Greece, and Turkey
invaded.28 Turks were eventually able to gain control of thirty percent of
the island.29 The island is still separated by a United Nations monitored
Green Line; the north side is administered by Turkish Cypriots while the
south is administered by Greek Cypriots.30 Turkish Cypriots established
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the northern side of Cyprus.31
The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not a member of the United
Nations and Turkey is the only country to recognize it.32 In international
law, the northern part of Cyprus is considered to be under Turkish invasion
and is referred to as a Turkish-occupied part.33
C. Other Recent Incidents Between Greece and Turkey
An incident in 1996 over the islets of Imia revived the Aegean issues.34
Even though these islets do not have any economic or geopolitical
significance, their legal status is crucial for the determination of the
ownership of several islands, islets and rocks around the Dodecanese.35
After exchanges of fierce statements by both states prime ministers, the
naval forces of Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies, sailed to the islets.36
A military crisis was prevented by the mediation efforts of the United
States and NATO.37
Recently, hostilities in the Aegean increased once more over the
Syrian refugee crisis38 because many refuges have been trying to reach

28. Id. at 23.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Tashin Ertugruloglu, Recent Developments in the Cyprus Issue: a Realistic
Appraisal, 10 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 223, 223-28 (2003).
32. See Suzanne Palmer, The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus: Should the United
States Recognize it as an Independent State, 4 B.U. INTL L.J. 423, 423 (1986).
33. Bora, supra note 21, at 44.
34. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 19-20.
35. See KRATEROS M. IOANNOU, GREECE AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 140-47 (Theodore
C. Kariotis ed., 1997).
36. Celestine Bohlen, Greek Premier Already in Hot Water, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1996,
at A8.
37. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 20.
38. Turkey hosts 3.6 million Syrian refugees as of 2019, making Turkey the largest host
of refugees. 10 Years On, Turkey Continues Its Support for an Ever-Growing Number of
Syrian Refugees, THE WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/
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Europe from Turkey through Greece. Originally, Turkey and the European
Union had signed a refugee deal in 2016 to stop the refugee flow into
Europe.39 In February 2020, being unhappy with the efforts of the
European Union regarding their fulfilment of this deal, Turkey declared
that it had opened up its borders for refugees seeking passage to Europe.40
This declaration resulted in the accumulation of thousands of refugees on
the Greek borders, who were met with a violent crackdown by Greek
police.41
Apart from these aforementioned ongoing crises, there are also other
conflicts taking place between these two countries in the Mediterranean.
Greece and Turkey cannot agree on maritime zone delimitation of their
exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in the Mediterranean.42
In recent years, it has been claimed that the east Mediterranean Sea may
possess rich oil and natural gas fields, and such claims have resulted in the
escalation of a tense atmosphere in the Mediterranean.43
II. THE TERRITORIAL WATERS DISPUTE
The dispute regarding the delimitation of territorial waters is one of
the chief issues of the compound Aegean Dispute. This dispute is
significant because states can exercise full sovereignty over their territorial
waters, with the exception of innocent passage by ships.44 Greeces
ratification of UNCLOS was a contributing factor to the conflict.45 Turkey
neither signed nor ratified UNCLOS.46 In fact, Turkey was one of the four
2021/06/22/10-years-on-turkey-continues-its-support-for-an-ever-growing-number-ofsyrian-refugees [https://perma.cc/WX5D-SKFK] (last visited May 26, 2022).
39. See Manuel P. Schoenhuber, The European Unions Refugee Deal with Turkey: A
Risky Alliance Contrary to European Laws and Values, 40 HOUS. J. INTL L. 633, 659
(2018). This agreement has been criticized by many scholars because it closed the
European doors to many refugees, especially the ones fleeing from Syria.
40. Matina Stevis-Gridneff and Carlotta Gall, Erdogan Says, We Opened the Doors,
and Clashes Erupt as Migrants Head for Europe, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 2020, at A9.
41. Id.
42. Turkeys Legal Approach to Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Eastern
Mediterranean
Sea,
INSIGHT
TURKEY
(Updated:
March
9,
2021),
https://www.insightturkey.com/article/turkeys-legal-approach-to-maritime-boundarydelimitation-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-sea [https://perma.cc/AGB3-MDY2].
43. See Constantine Levoyannis & Mathieu Labreche, The Geopolitics of Energy in the
Eastern Mediterranean, 3 EEJ 46, 46 (2013).
44. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 2, 19.
45. See Schmitt, supra note 2, at 24-26.
46. Emily A. Georgiades, The IMIA Islets: A Beginning to the Maritime Delimitation
of the Aegean Sea Dispute, 17 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 103, 106 (2011).
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states to cast a negative vote, and Article 3 was one of the main reasons
for its negative vote.47 Article 3 of UNCLOS establishes the breadth of
territorial waters and states that, every State has the right to establish the
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding twelve nautical
miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this
Convention.48 Before 1936, Greece claimed three nautical miles of
territorial waters in the Aegean,49 and later increased it to six nautical miles
with a law issued in 1936.50 Presently, Turkey also claims six nautical
miles of territorial waters in the Aegean.51 Even though Greece later
ratified UNCLOS, it has not exercised its right to twelve nautical mile
territorial waters in the Aegean.52 However, Greece has been consistently
claiming that, according to UNCLOS, it has a reserved right to twelve
nautical mile territorial waters.53 Greek signature to UNCLOS, and related
claims, has been responded to very fiercely by Turkey, interpreting both
sufficiently serious enough as to regard Greek signature and potential
territorial sea claims as a casus belli.54

47. Nilufer Oral, Non-Ratification of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: An Aegean
Dilemma of Environmental and Global Consequence, 1 BERKELEY J. INTL L. PUBLICIST
53, 53 (2009).
48. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 3.
49. Background Note on Aegean Disputes, THE TURKISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/background-note-on-aegean-disputes.en.mfa [https://
perma.cc/PD6N-C7JV] (last visited May 26, 2022).
50. N. 230/1936 Ar. 1 (concerning the extension of the territorial waters of the Kingdom
of Greece).
51. U.S. Navy Judge Advoc. Gen. Corps, Turkey 2016, MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE
MANUAL, https://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_mcrm.htm [https://perma.cc/
ZX85-4DV2] (last visited May 26, 2022), https://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/
documents/mcrm/Turkey2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6ZZ-4BA5] (last visited May 26,
2022).
52. U.S. Navy Judge Advoc. Gen. Corps, Greece 2014, MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE
MANUAL, https://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_mcrm.htm [https://perma.cc/
ZX85-4DV2] (last visited May 26, 2022), https://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/
documents/mcrm/Greece2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/FL8M-2FK9] (Last visited May 26,
2022).
53. Jon M. Van Dyke, An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes under International Law, 36
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 63, 83 (2005).
54. See Text of the Grand National Assemblys Unanimous Declaration of June 8, 1995
(TRT TV Ankara broadcast, June 8, 1995) (transcribed by BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts), available in LEXIS.
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A. Parties Claims Regarding Territorial Waters in the Aegean
1. The Territorial Seas of Greece and Turkey

According to Greece, the only issue in the Aegean between the two
states is the continental shelf dispute, specifically as it pertains to Greek
islands.55 Greece regards its right of territorial waters under the framework
of complete sovereignty and does not agree that there is uncertainty, or
any type of conflict, on that matter.56 Greece claims that [m]aritime
boundaries between Greece and Turkey are clearly delimited by
international agreements, and in the absence of an agreement, boundaries
are delimited by customary international law.57 Greece refers to UNCLOS
Article 15,58 the Athens Protocol of November 26, 1926, and the
Agreement and Protocol of 1932 between Italy and Turkey, as the
customary international law pertaining to the issue.59 Greece asserts that
these delimitation agreements are in full force, and where there is no
agreement, the principle of equidistance applies.60 Even after the Imia
crisis, it has been asserted by Greece that there was only one issue in the
Aegean, and that was the delimitation of the continental shelf.61

55. Greek-Turkish dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf, HELLENIC
REPUBLIC MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkishrelations/relevant-documents/delimitation-of-the-continental-shelf.html
[https://perma.cc/SRT2-SPFW] (last visited Sep. 10, 2021).
56. Issues of Greek  Turkish Relations, HELLENIC REPUBLIC MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/
[https://perma.cc/
X88S-6LME] (last visited Sep. 10, 2021).
57. Maritime boundaries, HELLENIC REPUBLIC MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/maritimeboundaries.html [https://perma.cc/27GQ-K8TJ] (Last visited Sep. 10, 2021).
58. The language of Article 15 of UNCLOS is as follows: Where the coasts of two
States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing
agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median
line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above provision
does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special
circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance
therewith. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 15. This principle is referred to as the principle of
equidistance.
59. Maritime boundaries, supra note 57.
60. Id.
61. BYRON THEODOROPOULOS, THE SO-CALLED AEGEAN DISPUTE: WHAT ARE THE
STAKES: WHAT IS THE COST? IN GREECE AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 325, 327 (Theodore C.
Kariotis ed., 1997).
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On the other hand, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs lists the
delimitation of territorial waters in the Aegean as one of the outstanding
issues with Greece.62 The Turkish claim is that the Parties have not reached
any agreement for the delimitation of their territorial waters.63 Turkey
accepts as customary international law the rule that states with adjacent or
opposite coasts should reach a delimitation agreement.64 As Turkey moves
forward by stating there is no agreement between Greece and Turkey
regarding maritime delimitation in the Aegean, neither for the adjacent nor
opposite coasts they share, Turkey may challenge the enforceability of the
claimed rules of customary international law asserted by Greece. It is put
forth by the Turkish side that, [e]xtension of territorial waters to twelve
nautical miles will disproportionately alter the balance of interests in the
Aegean Sea to the detriment of Turkey.65 In the present situation of Greek
claiming six nautical miles, because Greece has more than two-thousand
islands in the Aegean, Greek territorial waters make up about forty percent
of the Aegean Sea. If Greece is to increase its territorial waters to twelve
nautical miles, Greek ownership will rise to over seventy percent.66 In the
case of such an extension, Turkish territorial waters will fall below ten
percent of the Aegean Sea while the size of the high seas will fall from
fifty-one percent to nineteen percent.67 Turkey believes the extension of
Greek territorial waters to twelve nautical miles will turn the Aegean Sea
into a Greek lake.68
Greece has been basing its reservation of twelve nautical mile
territorial waters on Article 3 of UNCLOS.69 Some navigational provisions
of UNCLOS are accepted to be customary international law.70 Turkey is
not a party to UNCLOS and has never shown any sign of interest in
signature or ratification, compared to, for example, the United States, who
also has neither signed nor ratified the UNCLOS yet has expressed many
times that the navigational provisions are accepted as customary
international law.71
62. The Outstanding Aegean Issues, supra note 1.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. The Outstanding Aegean Issues, supra note 1.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 16, 25.
69. George P. Politakis, The Aegean Agenda: Greek National Interests and the New
Law of the Sea Convention, 10 INTL J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 497, 498 (1995).
70. See id.
71. Ryan P. Kelley, UNCLOS, but No Cigar: Overcoming Obstacles to the Prosecution
of Maritime, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2285, 2296 (2011).
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Customary international law develops over time between states, based
upon a relatively consistent practice done out of a sense of legal obligation
(opinio juris).72 Turkey has not acquiesced to the formation of customary
international law based upon UNCLOS in general, let alone using Article
3 to delimit territorial seas.73 Turkey has been a persistent objector to
UNCLOS since the beginning of the negotiation conferences and has kept
the same position ever since.74 If UNCLOS is accepted as customary
international law, it still would not have any binding effect on Turkey
because customary international law rule cannot be binding on persistent
objector states.75 Turkey can even assert that the rule of six nautical mile
territorial waters has been an established regional practice in the Aegean
because both Parties have been claiming six nautical mile territorial waters
for decades.76
Extension of territorial waters by Greece will not only shrink the area
of Turkish waters but of international waters as well. It has been suggested
by Turkish scholars that extension of Greek territorial waters will pose a
threat to Turkish national security and navigational freedom.77 If such an
extension were to occur, Turkey would have to pass through Greek
territorial waters in order to reach Istanbul and the Port of Izmir, Turkeys
second largest port.78 This extension would also have an effect on Turkeys
national defense because the Turkish Army would significantly lose its
capability and flexibility to organize the defense of the Turkish coast.79
However, in territorial waters, there is an exception to the sovereignty of
the coastal state, and that is the right of innocent passage.80 Thus, Turkish
ships can exercise innocent passage in Greek territorial waters, with some
limitations. For example, innocent passage must always be on the
surface.81 This means Turkish submarines would be unable to submerge in
Greek waters. Also, in times of war and emergency, Greece could
completely suspend innocent passage.82 This would likely pose security
72. See Hiroshi Taki, Opinio Juris and the Formation of Customary International Law:
A Theoretical Analysis, 51 GERMAN Y.B. INTL L. 447, 464 (2008).
73. Georgiades, supra note 46, at 107.
74. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 84.
75. Peter Prows, Tough Love: The Dramatic Birth and Looming Demise of UNCLOS
Property Law (and What Is to Be Done About It), 42 TEX. INTL L.J. 241, 246 n.19 (2007).
76. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 83.
77. See Cuneyt Yenigun, Aegean Maritime Boundaries: Issues and Solutions, 6
TURKISH REVIEW OF BALKAN STUDIES 153, 158 (2001).
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 17.
81. Id. art. 20.
82. Id. art. 25.
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threats unacceptable to Turkey. In addition, during war time, a Turkish
ally state, or another state with the authorization to pass through the
Turkish Straits, may also need to get Greek authorization. Moreover,
because Turkeys size of ownership of the high seas could shrink,
Turkeys high seas freedom would be negatively impacted.83
2. The Territorial Seas of Greek and Turkish Islands
When it comes to the territorial sea of islands in the Aegean, the Greek
suggestion is to apply the principle of equidistance, based specifically on
the law of the sea.84 Even though the first half of Article 15 of UNCLOS
suggests the application of the principle of equidistance between states of
adjacent or opposite coasts as a default, the second half of Article 15 states
that the principle of equidistance does not apply  . . . where it is necessary
by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the
territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith.85
Since Turkey and Greece have both opposite and adjacent coasts in the
Aegean, the conflict requires a more specific and specialized resolution.
Additionally, some Greek islands are on the wrong side, meaning that
they are on the Turkish side of the median line. For instance, Samos is
situated around 1.6 kilometers away from the Turkish coast, Meis is
around 3.5 kilometers away, and Chios is 6 kilometers away. The
geographic proximity of Greek islands to the Turkish coast is highly likely
to create a special circumstance in the Aegean for delimiting the
territorial waters. This may also be the reason why the Parties have not
been able to settle on an agreement through diplomatic channels.
Article 121 of UNCLOS defines the rights of islands in international
maritime law. Pursuant to that article, except for rocks that cannot sustain
any human life and economic activities, islets and islands are entitled to
the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and
the continental shelf.86 Islands are afforded the same rights as the
mainland and provisions in UNCLOS that relate to the maritime zones are
applicable to islands as well. In the interest of equity, international rulings
will, at time, give islands lesser effect than they are entitled to pursuant to
UNCLOS.87 Prevention of a gross disproportion of shares, the preservation
83. FARAJ ABDULLAH AHNISH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW

OF

MARITIME BOUNDARIES

AND THE PRACTICE OF STATES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA 268 (1993).

84. Greek-Turkish dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf, supra note 55.
85. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 15.
86. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 121.
87. Phaedon John Kozyris, Islands in the Recent Maritime Adjudications: Simplifying
the Aegean Conundrum, 39 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 329, 329 (2008).
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of freedom of navigation, and the security interests of parties can play a
crucial role in such instances.88
3. The Aegean as a Semi-Enclosed Sea
Additionally, because the Aegean is a semi-enclosed sea, another issue
arises. Article 123 of UNCLOS acknowledges that enclosed or semienclosed seas require a different and more specialized regime.89 States
bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each
other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties
under this Convention.90 Under this article, Greece has a direct obligation
to cooperate with Turkey as both Parties exercise their rights in the
Aegean. It has also been suggested that Turkey can make reference to
Article 300 of UNCLOS, which says that states should exercise their rights
relating to the Convention in a manner which would not constitute an
abuse of rights.91 Though at first glance it may seem that Greece should
be entitled to twelve nautical miles of territorial waters and delimitation
by the principle of equidistance, this extension would completely engulf
the southeastern side of the Aegean Sea into Greek territorial waters and
severely hamper Turkish navigational freedom.92
B. Instructive International Adjudications on the Delimitation of
Territorial Waters
1. Nicaragua v. Honduras
One recent example to these international adjudications is the case of
Nicaragua v. Honduras.93 Nicaragua and Honduras had an ongoing
dispute since the nineteenth century regarding the maritime delimitation
and entitlement of several islands in the Caribbean Sea.94 The International
88. See id. at 330.
89. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 123.
90. Id.
91. Yuksel Inan & Sertac H. Baseren, The Troubled Situation of the Aegean Territorial
Waters, 4 ETUDES HELLENIQUES / HELLENIC STUDIES 55, 61 (1996).
92. Van Dyke, supra note 70, at 84.
93. Case Concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and
Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 659 (Oct. 8)
[hereinafter Nicar. v. Hond.].
94. Coalter G. Lathrop, Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and
Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), 102 AM. J. INTL L. 113, 113
(2008).
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Court of Justice started its decision by first identifying the relevant coasts
and territorial lands.95 After determining that four of the disputed islands
belonged to Honduras and one to Nicaragua, the Court reached a decision
on the maritime delimitation conflict.96 The Court emphasized the equal
treatment of all coasts, whether belonging to an island or the mainland.97
According to the International Court of Justice, states have the right to
extend their territorial waters to twelve nautical miles from its mainland
or for islands under its sovereignty.98 A historic title or special
circumstance could provide a possible exception to this rule. Nicaragua
claimed that such an extension for the islands on the opposite side would
result in gross inequity.99 The Court took these claims under consideration
but did not find any gross disproportion and established that if there was
any inequity, the islands on the opposite side would have an insignificant
effect.100 Regarding situations where a line is to cover several zones of
coincident jurisdiction, the Court noted that the application of equitable
principles, which is similar to the equidistance method, could be applied.101
However, even though the method of equidistance had a certain intrinsic
value and scientific character, it did not have priority over other methods
of delimitation and, in particular circumstances, there may be factors
which make the application of the equidistance method inappropriate.102
2. Romania v. Ukraine
A similar dispute arose between Ukraine and Romania. In 2004,
Romania filed a case against Ukraine in the International Court of Justice
for a dispute relating to the delimitation of their continental shelf,
exclusive economic zone, and Serpents Island.103 Although there was no
controversy regarding the territorial waters, the case was significant
because the Court clarified its 3-step process for deciding on disputes of
maritime zone delimitation.104 The Court held that its methodology for
95. Nicar. v. Hond., 2007 I.C.J., ¶ 289.
96. Phaedon John Kozyris, Islands in the Recent Maritime Adjudications: Simplifying
the Aegean Conundrum, 39 OCEAN DEV. & INTL L. 329, 331 (2008).
97. Id.
98. Nicar. v. Hond., 2007 I.C.J., ¶ 302.
99. Id. ¶ 98.
100. Id. ¶¶ 300-304.
101. Id. ¶ 271.
102. Id. ¶ 272.
103. Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 61,
¶¶ 1, 23 (Feb. 3).
104. See Jessica Cooper & Nina Mohseni, Case: Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea
(Rom. v. Ukr.), 9 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTL & COMP. LAW 1, 1-2 (2009).
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defining maritime zones consisted of first, drawing an equidistance line
between appropriate basepoints of two coasts; second, weighing any
factors that may make the equidistance line inequitable, and; third, making
sure that the other relevant factors such as proportionality and coastal
lengths would assure the fairness of the equidistance line.105 While
delimiting the maritime zones, the Court considered the security interests
and economic activities of the Parties as well as the geographic features of
the Black Sea.106 The Court also examined whether Serpents Island had
any significance to Ukraine other than its potential effect in maritime
delimitation.107 In case of an arbitration on the Aegean Dispute, an arbitral
tribunal is very likely to follow the methodology of the International Court
of Justice in order to reach an equitable solution.
3. Qatar v. Bahrain
Another example that may be instructive to a potential arbitral tribunal
on the Aegean Dispute is the application of equitable principles in the
Qatar v. Bahrain decision for the delimitation of maritime zones.108 In
order to delimit the Persian Gulf between the two Parties, the International
Court of Justice first drew an equidistance line and then made sure that
there were no special circumstances making the equidistance line unfair.109
For instance, the Court ruled that giving Fasht al Azman underwater
area between the Partiestwelve nautical mile territorial waters would
push the equidistance line too far east, and would create disproportionality
in the area.110 The Island of Jaradah was also recognized as a special
circumstance by the Court.111 It was ignored completely while delimiting
the maritime borders since it could disproportionally push the median line
against Qatar if given effect.112
However, an island on the wrong side cannot automatically create a
special circumstance. As an example, the International Tribunal for the
105. David H. Anderson, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea Case (Rom. v. Ukr.), 8
LAW & PRAC. INTL CTS. & TRIBUNALS 305, 315-317 (2009).
106. Id. at 321-23.
107. Petros Siousiouras & Georgios Chrysochou, The Aegean Dispute in the Context of
Contemporary Judicial Decisions on Maritime Delimitation, 3 LAWS 12, 21-22 (2014).
108. Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar
and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 40 (Mar. 16) [hereinafter Qatar v.
Bahr.].
109. Kozyris, supra note 87, at 334.
110. Id. at 335.
111. Qatar v. Bahr., 2001 I.C.J., ¶¶ 179, 195, 219.
112. Kozyris, supra note 87, at 335.

2022]

DRAWING LINES IN THE AEGEAN

121

Law of the Sea decided in Bangladesh v. Myanmar that an island, simply
by being on the wrong side, cannot create a special circumstance that will
prevent the application of the principle of equidistance.113 The location of
the island and its proximity to the equidistance line must be examined
altogether to decide if it creates a special circumstance.114
C. How Would a Potential Arbitral Tribunal Decide?
The method of using an equidistance line has been widely applied in
maritime delimitation cases. However, it is observed that the equidistance
line is not a stiff method that leaves no room for alteration. When special
circumstances exist in an area, the equidistance line can be altered to attain
equitable and fair solutions.
The Greek mainland is entitled to twelve nautical mile territorial
waters under UNCLOS. However, the islands on the eastern side of the
Aegean, those that are in close proximity to the Turkish coast, are likely
to be regarded as special circumstances. Extension of the territorial waters
of all Greek islands to twelve nautical miles will not only injure Turkeys
right to high seas freedom, but more importantly, Turkeys unimpeded
ability to move its ships and planes between the Turkish Straits and the
Mediterranean.115
One suggestion is to divide the Aegean into west and east. The
islands in the East Aegean are much closer to the Turkish coast than to the
Greek coast. This is where a special circumstance can arise. In the West
Aegean Sea, Greece can claim twelve nautical mile territorial waters or
request the application of the principle of equidistance. In the East Aegean
Sea, especially around the Dodecanese, Greece can claim three or six
nautical mile territorial waters depending on the proximity of the island to
the Turkish coast.
In other circumstances, states have agreed to claim three nautical mile
territorial waters so as not to hamper navigational freedom. For instance,
Venezuela claims three nautical mile territorial waters for its island of Isla
Patos near Trinidad-Tobago, Abu Dhabi claims three nautical mile
territorial waters for its island of Dayyinah near Qatar, and Australia
113. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh
and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Case No. 16, Judgment of
Mar. 14, 2012, ITLOS Rep. 4 [hereinafter Bangl./Myan. Dispute]; Riddhi Shah,
BangladeshMyanmar ITLOS Verdict: Precedence for India?, 37 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
178, 179 (2013).
114. Bangl./Myan. Dispute, ITLOS Rep. 4, ¶¶ 78-79.
115. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 84.
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claims three nautical mile territorial waters for its islands in the Torres
Strait near Papua New Guinea.116
III. THE DISPUTE REGARDING THE LEGAL STATUS OF ISLANDS, ISLETS,
AND ROCKS IN THE AEGEAN
The second dispute in the Aegean Sea relates to the legal status of
several islands, islets, and rocks between Greece and Turkey. Because the
Parties cannot agree on the legal status of some geographic figures, they
cannot agree on the delimitation of their territorial seas and continental
shelves. In fact, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the
dispute concerning the status of some islands, rocks, and islets is the
stumbling blocks before reaching a settlement as regards the delineation
of maritime boundaries between the two countries.117 Similar to the
dispute regarding delimitation of territorial waters, Greece disagrees that
there lays a controversy about the status of geographic figures in the
Aegean.118 The Greek standpoint is that the treaties between the Parties are
clear and do not lead to any controversy.119
Turkey claims that the dispute has arisen because Greece and Turkey
had contesting claims . . . emanating from differing interpretations
related to the meaning, scope, intent and legal effect of the territorial
provisions of the relevant and valid international instruments in this
respect.120 In essence, this part of the Aegean Dispute is mainly related to
treaty interpretation between the Parties. While Turkey recognizes the
indisputable Greek authority of some islands in the Aegean without
agreeing on the extension of their maritime boundaries, for some of the
geographic figures closer to the Turkish coast, Turkey does not even
recognize Greek sovereignty over them let alone their maritime zones.121
In order for an arbitral tribunal to render any decision at all, the
determination of the legal status of these geographic figures must be the
very first step. After determining the legal status of those maritime features
in the Aegean, an arbitral tribunal will need to consider whether they are
entitled to maritime zones. If the answer is affirmative for the second step,
the tribunal will then need to consider the relevant factors in the area and
116. HIRAN W. JAYEWARDENE, THE REGIME OF ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 425,
425, 437, 482 (Shigeru Oda ed., 1990).
117. The Outstanding Aegean Issues, supra note 1.
118. Toppare, supra note 9, at 23.
119. Issues of Greek  Turkish Relations, supra note 56.
120. The Outstanding Aegean Issues, supra note 1.
121. See id.
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decide how much maritime zone should be given to which individual
island and islet.
A. Background of the Dispute
Greece owns more than two thousand islands in the Aegean.122 When
it comes to the disputed geographic figures in the area, the first essential
step is to examine the language of the relevant treaties.
The first treaty to result in ambiguity, and hence conflict, is the
Lausanne Treaty.123 This Treaty has ended many conflicts between the
Parties.124 In Article 6 of the Lausanne Treaty, the Parties agreed that in
the absence of provisions to the contrary . . . islands and islets lying within
three miles of the coast are included within the frontier of the coastal
State.125 In the 1920s, the common and accepted breadth of territorial
waters was 3 nautical miles.126 It can be interpreted that, in the absence of
provisions to the contrary, the islets and islands situated in one states
territorial waters shall belong to that same coastal state.127
Article 15 of the Lausanne Treaty is also essential to the Aegean
Dispute, and it states as follows:
Turkey renounces in favour of Italy all rights and title over the
following islands: Stamalia (Astrapalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki
(Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros
(Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso),
Simi (Symi), and Cos (Kos), which are now occupied by Italy, and
the islets dependent thereon, and also over the island of
Castellorizzo.128
122. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 17.
123. Lausanne Treaty of Peace, supra note 16.
124. The Lausanne Treaty of Peace is one of the most important treaties in Turkish
history. It drew the borders of the Republic of Turkey and it ended the Turkish War of
Independence 1919-1923. It not only determined the sovereignty on the Anatolian
mainland but also on the Aegean islands. See discussion infra Section I(A).
125. Lausanne Treaty of Peace, supra note 16, art. 6.
126. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 73. In 1598, Denmark was the first state to adopt 3
nautical mile territorial waters, and Fernardo Galiani, an Italian diplomat, also
acknowledged the territorial waters for 3 nautical miles in 1782, as this was the longest
cannon-shot at that time. Arda Ozkan, Uluslararası Deniz Hukuku Açısından Ege Denizi
Kıta Sahanlığı Uyuşmazlığı [Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Dispute in Terms of
International Law of the Sea] (July 2009) (Unpublished Masters thesis on file with the
Karadeniz Technical University Library Repository System).
127. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 73.
128. Lausanne Treaty of Peace, supra note 16, art. 15.
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Pursuant to this treaty, Turkey had ceded the Dodecanese Islands to
Italy.129 The wording to be noted here is the islets dependent thereon,
which had not been defined by the Lausanne Treaty. In 1947 Greece
signed the Paris Treaty, and in Article 14 Italy ceded full sovereignty over
the Dodecanese and Castellerizo islets as well as the adjacent isles.130
The Paris Treaty used the term adjacent islets instead of dependent
islets.131 The differing terms has resulted in differing interpretations by
the Parties. It is unclear whether the negotiators of these treaties were
aiming for a distinction between adjacent and dependent islets, or they
indeed were referring to the same group of islands. However, [a]djacent
is a more precise term because it refers to geographic contiguity and allows
the distinction to be made by cartographers rather than psychologists or
philosophers.132
B. The Disputed Islands of the Aegean
The ambiguity between these treaty provisions is creating two conflict
areas when it comes to the legal status of islands, islets, and rocks in the
Aegean. The first is the long-disputed Imia (Kardak) Rocks, and the
second is the islets of Gavdos and Gavdopula, which lay thirty kilometers
south to Crete.133
1. The Imia Rocks
The Imia  or, by its Turkish name, Kardak  crisis broke out in
1995.134 The islet is approximately 10 acres in size, and, as the title of this
subsection suggests, is comprised of many rocks. At the time of the
incident, it was uninhabited, it had no flag flying on it, and it had no
military force present.135 Today, the Imia rocks do not hold any significant
military or economic benefit or use.136
On December 25, 1995 a Turkish cargo ship hit and went aground on
the Imia islet.137 The captain of the cargo ship rejected Greek help at first
129. Id.
130. Paris Treaty of Peace, supra note 19, art. 14.
131. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 66.
132. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 68.
133. Id. at 70.
134. CAROL MIGDALOVITZ, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 96-140 F, GREECE AND TURKEY: THE
ROCKY ISLET CRISIS (1996).
135. Id.
136. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 73.
137. Id.
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insisting that the islet was Turkish territory.138 The mayor of a neighboring
Greek island raised a Greek flag on the Imia islet.139 The Turkish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs protested this action by sending a note to Greece that
the Imia rocks were under Turkish sovereignty.140 Upon rejection of this
claim by the Greek side, several Turkish journalists landed on the islet by
helicopter, lowered the Greek flag and raised a Turkish flag instead.141
Although this action was later disapproved by the Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, it still increased the tension in the area.142 Both Turkey
and Greece ended up sending their fleets and military forces to the area
and preparation for a war had started when then conflict was settled by the
successful mediation efforts of the United States.143 Both Parties withdrew
from the islet and removed their flags, and now there is no flag on the islet
and its entitlement is still disputed.144
Greece claims that the Imia Rocks are dependent islands of
Kalymnos (which belongs to the Dodecanese Islands) based on the 1923
Lausanne Treaty.145 In response to that, Turkey claims that the Imia Rocks
have not been mentioned specifically in any treaty between the Parties.146
The rocks and islet are situated 3.8 nautical miles from the Turkish
mainland.147 They are much more adjacent to Turkey than to Greece and
thus, pursuant to the Paris Treaty, the Imia Rocks are under Turkish
sovereignty.148 As seen, both treaties to which the Parties are referring to
are in effect, and their ambiguous language is the source of the
controversy.
2. The Islets of Gavdos and Gavdapula
The situation with the islets of Gavdos and Gavdapula have been more
tranquil compared to the Imia crisis. These islets are situated close to the
Greek island of Crete. Turkey claims that the islets of Gavdos and
Gavdopula have been under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire and
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Anastasia Strati, Postscript: Tension in the Aegean - The Imia Incident, 9 LEIDON
J. INTL L. 122, 122 (1996).
142. MIGDALOVITZ, supra note 134.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 69.
146. See Inan & Baseren, supra note 91, at 65.
147. Krateros Ioannou, A Tale of Two Islets: The Imia Incident Between Greece and
Turkey, 1 THESIS, A JOURNAL OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES 33, § 5.1(e) (1997).
148. Inan & Baseren, supra note 91, at 64-65.
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they have never been openly mentioned or ceded to any state by any
treaty.149 By the Treaty of London in 1913, the Ottoman Empire had ceded
Crete to Greece but the treaty made no mention of the islets of Gavdos and
Gavdopula.150 Greece has been exercising authority over these islets since
the twentieth century.151 Even though these two islets are currently under
active Greek administration, in 1996 the Turkish General Staff opposed
the inclusion of Gavdos islet in a NATO military exercise by claiming that
the islets legal status was controversial.152
The islets in controversy here are significantly smaller compared to
other islands in the Aegean. However, their significance is their relation to
the maritime delimitation of the Aegean Sea. According to Article 121 of
UNCLOS, islands are entitled to the same territorial waters, contiguous
zone, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone rights as any
mainland.153
C. Instructive International Adjudications on the Entitlement of Islands,
Islets, and Rocks
If a potential arbitral tribunal is to settle the Aegean dispute, there are
several instructive adjudications that the Tribunal could gain guidance
from. Most of these adjudications settled disputes regarding legal
entitlement of islands by taking into account the principles of equity and
the state authority exercised over the islands.
1. Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration
The Eritrea v. Yemen decision154 is significant for two reasons. First,
it is an arbitration case that deals with a conflict similar to the conflict
between Greece and Turkey. Second, the Lausanne Treaty is one of the
primary legal structures analyzed.
The 1998 dispute between Eritrea and Yemen concerned the
delimitation of continental shelves and exclusive economic zones. The
Arbitral Tribunal also paid some attention to the delimitation of territorial

149. Id. at 70.
150. See Treaty of London, May 30, 1913, 107 British and Foreign State Papers 656.
151. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 73.
152. Id. at 70.
153. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 121.
154. Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the second stage of the proceedings between
Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime Delimitation) 22 R.I.A.A. 333 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1999)
[hereinafter Eri./Yemen].
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waters.155 It was accepted that the small islets (defined as rocks in
UNCLOS) were entitled to twelve nautical mile territorial waters even if
they cannot sustain any human habitation and economic life, yet they
would not be considered for an exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf.156 The Tribunal also made clear that for the determination of legal
entitlement, the historical claims were not ultimately helpful and
relevant.157 Instead, the Tribunal paid greater attention to the active
administration on the islands. Based on an evaluation of public claims,
legislative acts seeking to regulate activity on the islands, licensing of
activities in the surrounding waters, enforcement of fishing regulations,
licensing of tourist activity, search and rescue operations, environmental
protection, construction on the islands, and the exercising of criminal and
civil jurisdiction on the islands, the Tribunal awarded the islets of ZuqarHanish to Yemen.158 The reason for this decision was that Yemen had been
displaying a greater authority on those islets.159
Another issue the Tribunal considered while determining the
sovereignty over some islands was the islands location and geographical
proximity to Eritrea and Yemen.160 The Mohabbakahs and the Haycock
Islands were awarded to Eritrea because they were situated within twelve
nautical miles of the Eritrean coast.161 The Tribunal also made reference to
the Lausanne Treaty and confirmed its provision establishing that islands
within the territorial waters of one state shall be under the sovereignty of
that same coastal state.162
The Eritrea v. Yemen decision was not the first to recognize the rule
of recent and continuing authority for the determination of sovereignty
over islands. The Arbitral Tribunal for Eritrea v. Yemen based its ruling
on two very important cases. The first of these decisions is the Island of
Palmas Case, which was settled by the Permanent Court of Justice in
1928.163 The dispute was between the United States and the Netherlands.
155. Kozyris, supra note 87, at 336.
156. Eri./Yemen, 22 R.I.A.A., ¶¶ 119, 154, 158, 161.
157. Kozyris, supra note 87, at 336-337.
158. Eri./Yemen, 22 R.I.A.A., ¶ 450.
159. Id. ¶ 508.
160. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 72.
161. Eri./Yemen, 22 R.I.A.A., ¶ 458.
162. Id. ¶¶ 476-480.
163. Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law, Arbitral Award,
Rendered in Conformity with the Special Agreement Concluded on January 23, 1925
Between the United States of America and the Netherlands Relating to the Arbitration of
Differences Respecting Sovereignty Over the Island of Palmas (or Miangas) (U.S./Neth.),
2 R.I.A.A. 829 (April 4, 1928), reprinted in 22 AM. J. INTL L. 867, 909 (1928) [hereinafter
Island of Palmas].
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The United States was the colonial power ruling the Philippine Islands and
the Netherlands was governing Indonesia. During the proceedings, the
United States claimed Palmas Island was discovered by Spain and that the
United States was the successor of Spain in the Philippines.164 The
Netherlands, on the other hand, indicated her ongoing contact with the
island and claimed that her sovereignty over the island was a result of
agreements executed with native princes.165 Judge Max Huber, the sole
arbitrator in this case, ruled that historical claims were irrelevant and
international law did not support geographical proximity for making
sovereignty decisions.166 The island was awarded to the Netherlands
because she evoked a peaceful and continuous display of state authority
whereas the United States only claims were based on titles relating to acts
or circumstances leading to the acquisition of sovereignty.167
The second decision that the Eritrea v. Yemen Tribunal relied on was
from a case between France and the United Kingdom. Both had been
claiming sovereignty over the rocks and islets of Minquiers and Ecrehos.168
The International Court of Justice decided that Minquiers and Ecrehos
were under British sovereignty.169 The Court did not pay attention to the
historical sovereignty claims of the Parties but rather, considered the
recent and actual displays of authority.170 According to the evidence
presented to the Court, it was the United Kingdom who had been
exercising state functions and authority over the geographical features.171
2. Qatar v. Bahrain
Another example for a future arbitral tribunal on the Aegean Dispute
may be the Qatar v. Bahrain decision of the International Court of Justice,
a case initiated by Qatar in 1991.172 The dispute was in regard to the
sovereignty over islands in the Gulf region as well as delimitation of
maritime zones. The main disputed islands were the Hawar islands,
164. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 71.
165. Id; Island of Palmas, 22 AM. J. INTL L., at 874.
166. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 72.
167. Island of Palmas, 22 AM. J. INTL L., at 909-11.
168. Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (Fr./U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 50-51 (Nov. 17, 1953)
[hereinafter Minquiers and Ecrehos Case].
169. Id. at 72.
170. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 71.
171

Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 1953 I.C.J., at 70-72.

172. Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar
and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 40 (Mar. 16) [hereinafter Qatar v.
Bahr.].
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Zubarah Island, and the island of Jaradah.173 The International Court of
Justice first resolved the conflict regarding entitlement of these islands.
Following that, the Court ruled on maritime delimitation.
For the Hawar Islands, the Court consulted primary sources and other
legal documents relevant to the case. A decision by the British
Government in 1939 made clear that the Hawar Islands were under the
sovereignty of Bahrain.174 Bahrain also actively exercised sovereignty
over the islands, and for these reasons, the Court awarded the Hawar
Islands to Bahrain and rejected the claims from Qatar.175
Zubarah Island was another disputed island between Qatar and
Bahrain. While settling the dispute, the Court paid attention to the recent
authority on the island, rather than looking at the historical claims of the
Parties, and it ruled that since 1868, Qatari Sheikhs had been exercising
sovereign authority on the island.176 As Bahrain could not prove its active
and recent authority over the island, Zubarah was awarded to Qatar.177 This
decision marks the importance of exercising sovereign authority on an
island when making an entitlement decision.
The Island of Jaradah was also at the center of the controversy. Qatar
first claimed that being such a small geographic figure, Jaradah was not an
island and it could not be entitled to any maritime zones.178 Jaradah was
twelve nautical miles away from the coasts of both Parties.179 The
International Court of Justice ruled that Jaradah and it was under the
sovereignty of Bahrain.180 The standpoint of the International Court of
Justice while determining the entitlement of Jaradah was again the recent
and ongoing exercise of sovereignty over the island. Bahrain had placed a
navigation beacon, drilled an artesian water well on the uninhabited island,
and had been issuing permits for fishing and oil exploration.181

173. Kozyris, supra note 87, at 335.
174. Qatar v. Bahr., 2001 I.C.J., ¶ 103.
175. Id. ¶¶ 101, 128, 147.
176. Id. ¶ 96.
177. Id. ¶ 97.
178. Id. ¶¶ 191, 193. Jaradah is a geographical feature that, at high tide, measures 12 by
4 metres and 0.4 metres high. Malcolm D. Evans, Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation
and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 51 INTL &
COMP. L.Q. 709, 716 (2002).
179. Evans, supra note 178, at 716.
180. Qatar v. Bahr., 2001 I.C.J., ¶¶ 195-97.
181. Id.
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3. How Would a Potential Arbitral Tribunal Decide?

As seen above, international adjudications have set the ground rules
for determining sovereignty over disputed islands and islets. When it
comes to their application, the tribunal will also need to consider Article 6
of the Lausanne Treaty.182 According to this article, the islands and islets
in a states territorial waters should be awarded to the same coastal state.
This interpretation was also confirmed in the Eritrea v. Yemen decision.183
The Imia Rocks are much closer to the Turkish coast than to the Greek
coast, and they are situated inside the six nautical mile territorial waters of
Turkey.184 The Imia Rocks are uninhabited, and they cannot sustain any
human life or economic activities. Thus, if the Imia Rocks are granted to
Turkey, under Eritrea v. Yemen, they will be entitled to their own
territorial waters, but no continental shelf or exclusive economic zone
claim can be claimed by Turkey.
For the islets of Gavdos and Gavdopula, a potential tribunal will need
to consider the recent and continuous Greek sovereignty over them. If the
tribunal examines the last 100 years to determine sovereignty, it will be
clear that the islets have been governed by Greece even though they are
not specifically mentioned in any treaty.185 The islets also lay closer to
Greece. Here, Greece holds a significantly stronger position, and Turkey
will not be able to claim any sovereignty on the islets of Gavdos and
Gavdopula. Even though they are quite small, the islets have a population,
and they can sustain human life.186 It is very likely that a potential arbitral
tribunal would grant them their own continental shelf and exclusive
economic zone areas as well as territorial waters.

182. Lausanne Treaty of Peace, supra note 16; Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 73.
183. Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the second stage of the proceedings between
Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime Delimitation) 22 R.I.A.A. 333, ¶ 373 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1999)
[hereinafter Eri./Yemen]. The Mohabbakahs and the Haycock Islands were awarded to
Eritrea because they were in Eritrean territorial waters. Id. ¶¶ 370-71.
184. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 73.
185. Id.
186. While population increases in summer months due to tourism, the islets have an offseason population of around 100 people. Greece is preparing for a tourist influx - but is it
ready? EURONEWS (Updated: May 14, 2021) https://www.euronews.com/myeurope/2021/05/13/greece-is-preparing-for-a-tourist-influx-but-is-it-ready?
[https://perma.cc/2FL4-EZ25].
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IV. THE CONTINENTAL SHELF DISPUTE
The continental shelf is an American concept that was introduced later
to the international law of the sea.187 Before the 20th century, the
continental shelf was not an issue that was discussed internationally. On
September 28, 1945, Harry Truman, then president of the United States,
proclaimed an executive order declaring that the United States regards
the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf
beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as
appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and
control.188 This order also justified exploitation of the continental shelf
by making reference to the worldwide need for new sources of petroleum
and minerals.189 Later on, in 1953, the United States Congress enacted
this policy into the Outer Continental Shelf Act.190 Following was a need
to delimit and define the continental shelves in international law. This need
became more apparent as technology advanced and it became possible to
exploit the resources of the continental shelf, whether they be over or
under.
In 1958, the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf191 defined
the continental shelf:
(a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to
the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of
200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar
submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.192
The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf was later superseded
by UNCLOS, which put forth a clearer definition: [t]he continental shelf
of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
187. See Letter from Harold Ickes, U.S. Secretary of Interior, to Franklin D. Roosevelt,
U.S. President (June 5, 1943), in 11065-2 Foreign Relations of The United States:
Diplomatic Papers, 1945, at 1481 (1967).
188. RESEARCH CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE,
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY CASES: THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 2 (1992).
189. Kent W. Patterson, The Crescent and the Cross: Defining the Maritime Boundaries
of Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea, 17 LOY. MAR. L.J. 139, 144 (2018).
190. 43 U.S.C.A. §1331-1356(a) (1953).
191. The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf replaced the earlier notion of state
sovereignty over a small strip of the surrounding sea areas. The Convention came into force
on June 10, 1964, and reached a total number of fifty-eight members.
192. Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S.
311.
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that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation
of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, and if such
a natural prolongation does not exist, it extends to 200 nautical miles from
the baselines of where the territorial waters were measured.193 In two
exceptions, the continental shelf can be extended up to 350 nautical miles,
the first being the existence of submarine ridges.194 The other instance
occurs when the shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles, and if it does,
the coastal state can delineate its continental shelf by straight lines not
exceeding 60 nautical miles in length, connecting fixed points, defined by
coordinates of latitude and longitude.195 This definition is widely
accepted today.196
The coastal state enjoys the exclusive authority to explore, develop
and exploit the continental shelf for natural resources consist[ing] of the
mineral and other non-living resources of the sea-bed and subsoil together
with living organisms belonging to sedentary species.197 The continental
shelf grants a large amount of exploitative rights to the coastal state and
its significance has been increasing as the technology capable of
exploitation keeps advancing. For this reason, the importance of
continental shelf delimitation cannot be overstated.
The Lausanne Treaty did not address delimitation of the continental
shelf.198 While Greece is a party to both UNCLOS and the Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf, Turkey is a party to neither.199
Moreover, the specific geographics of the Aegean make it harder for
Turkey and Greece to delimit their continental shelf areas. The Aegean
Sea is semi-enclosed and its east-west length is less than 400 nauticalmiles, leaving Parties with overlapping maritime zones.200
A. The Escalation of the Continental Shelf Dispute
The conflict regarding the continental shelf delimitation in the Aegean
first appeared in 1963 when Greece issued exploration licenses for the
maritime zones and subsoil around Rhodes and Karpathos islands.201
While Greek research and exploration activities spread in the Aegean in
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 76(1).
Id. art. 76(6).
Id. art. 76(7).
Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 87.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 77(4).
See Lausanne Treaty of Peace, supra note 16.
Patterson, supra note 189, at 149.
Toppare, supra note 9, at 33.
Id. at 34.
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the following years, Turkey decided to respond by issuing exploration
licenses to Turkish State Petroleum Corporation in 1973.202 Greece
claimed the licenses encroached upon her continental shelf.203 Turkish
Petroleum Corporation only conducted exploratory operations but did not
actually exploit any resources.204 As Turkey conducted these operations,
the tension continued to rise in the area because Greece claimed that the
licenses issued by Turkey were of no legal effect and violated the
continental shelf rights of several Greek islands.205
In August of 1976, Greece appealed to the United Nations Security
Council and asked for a meeting regarding Turkeys alleged violations of
Greeces rights on its continental shelf.206 Greece claimed that Turkish
exploration operations in the Aegean Sea violated Greeces sovereignty
and threatened international peace and security.207 The Turkish reply to
these claims was that the continental shelf was not delimited in the Aegean
and exploration was only being conducted in the area that Turkey claimed
to be her continental shelf.208 Turkey also appealed to the United Nations
Security Council for inviting Greece into bilateral negotiations for the
delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean.209
Upon these appeals by Greece and Turkey, the United Nations
Security Council adopted Resolution 395,210 yet it was of no benefit. The
United Nations Security Council advised Greece and Turkey to do
everything in their power so as to reduce the tension in the area and
consider potential judicial measures to end the conflict, such as resort to
the International Court of Justice, in case diplomatic negotiations fail to
settle the issue.211
202. Patterson, supra note 189, at 158
203. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), Interim Protection Order, 1976
I.C.J. 3, ¶ 16 (Sept. 11) [hereinafter Interim Protection Order].
204. Patterson, supra note 189, at 158.
205. Toppare, supra note 9, at 47 (naming the islands as Samothrace, Lemnos, Agios
Efstratios, Lesvos, Chios, Psara and Andipsara).
206. Letter from George Papoulias, Permanent Representative of Greece to the United
Nations, to The President of the Security Council (Aug. 10, 1976). To locate this document,
go to https://documents.un.org/prod/ods.nsf/home.xsp (or current website of United
Nations Official Document System) and enter S/12167 into the Symbol field.
207. Id.
208. See Letter from Ilter Türkmen, Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United
Nations, to The Secretary-General (Aug. 11, 1976). To locate this document, go to
https://documents.un.org/prod/ods.nsf/xpSearchResultsM.xsp (or current website of
United Nations Official Document System) and enter S/12172 into the Symbol field.
209. Id.
210. S.C. Res. 395 (Aug. 25, 1976).
211. Id. ¶¶ 2-4.

134

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27:1&2

By this time Greece had already initiated the process with the
International Court of Justice. Pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice,212 Greece first claimed interim measures
from the Court so as to stop Turkey from conducting any more
explorations in the region and threatening peace and security.213 The
International Court of Justice denied the Greek request for interim
measures because the alleged breach by Turkey of the exclusivity of the
right claimed by Greece to acquire information concerning the natural
resources of areas of continental shelf, if it were established, is one that
might be capable of reparation by appropriate means.214 In order for the
International Court of Justice to grant interim measures, there should be
sufficient risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights of the state.215 The
Court also stated that the areas of continental shelf in which the activity
complained of by Greece took place are ex hypothesi areas which, at the
present stage of the proceedings, are to be considered by the Court as areas
in dispute, and with respect to which Turkey also claims rights of
exploration and exploitation.216 Therefore, it was established that Greek
sovereignty was not clear in the contested area by this order of the Court.
Greece then unilaterally instituted a case in the International Court of
Justice against Turkey, for the delimitation of the continental shelf in the
Aegean Sea.217 The case concerned only the continental shelf delimitation
and did not enclose any further claims regarding other maritime zones or
conflict in the Aegean. In December of 1978, the International Court of
Justice ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to settle the dispute.218 Yet, the
Court did acknowledge the legal dispute between Greece and Turkey
regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean, without
going into the merits of the dispute.219 In the end, neither diplomatic nor
judicial measures have yielded results on the continental shelf dispute.
The continental shelf dispute in the Aegean holds other significance
because it is the only issue accepted to exist by Greece. Greek claims for
212. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 41(1) (The Court shall have the
power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures
which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.).
213. Toppare, supra note 9, at 46.
214. Interim Protection Order, 1976 I.C.J., ¶ 33.
215. Id. ¶¶ 32-33.
216. Id. ¶ 28.
217. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.), Application, 1976 I.C.J. 3
(Aug. 10).
218. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.), Judgment, 1978 I.C.J. 3, ¶
109 (Dec. 19).
219. See id. ¶ 78.
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the Aegean completely disregard the other issues asserted by Turkey.220
The Turkish side regards the continental shelf issue as being only one of
the matters of the compound Aegean dispute.221 The biggest problem area
in the continental shelf dispute is again the eastern side of the Aegean Sea,
similar to the territorial waters dispute because many islands in the eastern
Aegean are situated just a few kilometers away from the Turkish coast.
The Greek stance on the continental shelf dispute is that every island,
as a rule of international law and pursuant to the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf and UNCLOS, is entitled to its own continental
shelf up to 200 nautical miles.222 If continental shelves overlap, the
delimitation should be a median line equidistant from the states baselines
(although UNCLOS only specifies using a median line to delimit territorial
sea claims).223 According to that position, Greece claims that the Greek
continental shelf should extend from the Greek mainland to a median line
between the eastern Greek islands, the Dodecanese and the Turkish
coast.224 Under this interpretation, virtually all of the Aegean seabed
except for the portion beneath the Turkish territorial sea would be under
Greek control.225 It has also been argued by Greek authors that a
continental shelf delimited by a median line in the Aegean, and ignoring
the islands in the eastern Aegean, would threaten physical contiguity and
military security of the Greek nation.226 Some Greek authors have stated
that even when the proportionality principle is applied, because Greece has
many islands in the Aegean that are entitled to continental shelf areas,
Turkey would have around ten to fifteen percent of the total continental
shelf area of the Aegean.227
On the other hand, Turkey strictly opposes the continental shelf claims
of the Greek islands. Turkey claims that it has a right to the Eastern half
of the Aegean Sea.228 The Turkish stance is that, as a semi-enclosed sea
and there being many Greek islands close to the Turkish coast, the Aegean
Sea should constitute a special case that will hamper several Greek islands
from having their own continental shelves.229 Turkey stresses its long
220. Issues of Greek  Turkish Relations, supra note 56.
221. The Outstanding Aegean Issues, supra note 1.
222. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 33.
223. Id.
224. Patterson, supra note 189, at 156.
225. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 33.
226. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 88.
227. Id. at 89.
228. Patterson, supra note 189, at 158.
229. See John K.T. Chao, The Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Dispute, 16 ANNALS
CHINESE SOCY INTL L. 7, 9 (1979).
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coastline, its large coastal population, its long maritime tradition, and its
historical usage of the Aegean for navigation and resource exploitation for
many centuries.230 As previously stated, Turkey is neither a party to the
1958 Geneva Convention on Continental Shelf nor UNCLOS. Being a
persistent objector, Turkey rejects the continental shelf rights of all
Aegean islands.231 Even though Turkey opposes the continental shelf areas
of the Greek islands by relying on the principles of equitable delimitation
and proportionality, since Turkey desires to exploit the seabed . . . it has
not questioned the exclusive control of a coastal state over the natural
resources of its continental shelf.232
Overall, the continental shelf dispute in the Aegean comes down to
whether all Greek islands should produce their own continental shelf areas
or not. Both Parties are aiming to control the maximum maritime area
possible in the Aegean. While Greece expects to have continental shelf
areas for all of its islands, Turkey repudiates the continental shelf area of
any Greek island. Being a legal issue, this is a question that can only be
answered by international law and the principles of equity and
proportionality. In similar disputes where courts have decided on the effect
of islands on continental shelf delimitation, the courts considered the
significance of islands in terms of population, economic activities, and
political status.233 A court may also consider security concerns, the
physical contiguity of the islands, and the principle of nonencroachment.234
Even though Article 76 of UNCLOS grants states the right to extend
their continental shelf to 200 nautical miles, and 350 nautical miles if
certain conditions are met, the regime for delimitation of the continental
shelf between states of adjacent and/or opposite coasts is different.
According to Article 83 of UNCLOS, [t]he delimitation of the continental
shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by
agreement on the basis of international law and if no agreement is reached
for a reasonable amount of time, states shall consult to reach peaceful
measures of dispute settlement pursuant to UNCLOS.235

230. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 88.
231. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 33.
232. Id.
233. See Stephen Beaglehole, The Equitable Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, 14
VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 415, 437 (1984).
234

The principle of non-encroachment suggests that maritime zones of one state
should not hamper another states access to the high seas from its own maritime
zones. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 7(6).
235. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 83.
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In order to delimit the continental shelf, it will first be necessary to
draw the baselines and delimit the territorial waters because the
continental shelf is measured from the same baselines used for those
waters. This exemplifies the reason that the Aegean dispute is a compound
matter. The delimitation of territorial waters and the drawing of the
baselines is utterly important because those matters affect the continental
shelf dispute and the exploitation of the resources of the Aegean Sea.
B. Instructive International Adjudications on Continental Shelf
Delimitation
Settled cases of continental shelf disputes provide an opportunity for
a potential arbitral tribunal to interpret the rules on the delimitation of the
continental shelf between neighboring states. Some of these cases, which
are important landmark developments for the rules of international law,
also include similarities to the Aegean dispute, discussed further below.
1. The North Sea Continental Shelf Dispute
The first relevant adjudication is that of the North Sea Continental
Shelf dispute between Germany, Netherlands, and Denmark.236 The
International Court of Justice rejected the claim that continental shelf
delimitation should be carried out by the principle of equidistance pursuant
to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.237 The Court
further noted that Germany was not a party to the Convention and the
principle of equidistance was not a customary international law rule.238 In
1969, the Court ruled that continental shelf boundaries shall be drawn
between parties in accordance with equitable principles that will entitle
parties to continental shelf areas which are natural prolongations of their
land territory under the sea.239 The Court applied a delimitation method
236. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v. Denmark; Germany v.
Netherlands), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20) [hereinafter North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases]. The North Sea case is significant for being the first maritime delimitation case
between adjacent states where the rule of proportionality was applied. It had been used as
a corrective element in the last step in order to prevent an inequitable outcome. See NUGZAR
DUNDUA, DELIMITATION OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ADJACENT STATES, UNITED
NATIONS NIPPON FOUNDATION FELLOW 17-20 (2006-2007),
https://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_pa
pers/dundua_0607_georgia.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JUZ-XNXA].
237. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J., ¶ 38.
238. Id. ¶¶ 22, 31
239. Id. ¶¶ 90-100.
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based on equitable principles and considered several factors such as the
natural prolongation, or general configuration, of the coastal States land
territory, its potential encroachment on other territories, the presence of
overlapping areas, and the physical and geological structure and natural
resources of the continental shelf areas involved.240 While delimiting the
continental shelf, the Court did not give effect to insignificant geographic
features because including them in the delimitation would lead to
inequitable and disproportionate results.241
2. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic
The case between the United Kingdom and France242 is both similar
and dissimilar to the Aegean Dispute. The United Kingdom owned a group
of islands, the Channel Islands, that were closer to the French coast than
its own.243 The International Court of Justice ruled that equitable principles
were always to be considered while delimiting maritime zones244 and
islands on the wrong side constituted a special circumstance.245 Based on
this assessment, the Court drew a median line between the United
Kingdom and France while simultaneously reserving a twelve nautical
mile enclave around the Channel Islands.246 However, the International
Court of Justice also stated that this method would not be suitable if a
group of islands stretched along the coast of another state.247 The Channel
Islands were a group of seven islands while Greece possesses six total
island groups with some of these groups having over ten islands within
them.248
The Court also considered the special circumstances and equitable
principles that may be relevant to continental shelf delimitation. The Court
held that the combined equidistance-special circumstances rule, in
effect, gives particular expression to a general norm that, failing
240. Patterson, supra note 189, at 151.
241. Kozyris, supra note 87, at 335.
242. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), 18 R.I.A.A. 3 (1977-78)
[hereinafter Anglo v. French Continental Shelf Case].
243. See id. ¶ 87.
244. Id. ¶ 195.
245. See E. D. Brown, Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 461,
517 (1979).
246. Anglo v. French Continental Shelf Case, 18 R.I.A.A., ¶¶ 201-202
247. Patterson, supra note 189, at 153.
248. Id. at 152.
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agreement, the boundary between states abutting on the same continental
shelf is to be determined on equitable principles.249 The Tribunal had
given half effect to the United Kingdoms Scilly Isles as they were situated
so closely to the opposite French coast.250
3. Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between
Cameroon and Nigeria
In 2003, the International Court of Justice delimited the land boundary
and the continental shelf/exclusive economic zone between Nigeria and
Cameroon.251 According to the Court, a cardinal rule is that when
delimiting the continental shelf, the first step is to draw an equidistance
line, and then consider claims regarding special circumstances, even in
situations where the coasts are adjacent or opposite.252 Based on this
consideration, adjustments can be made to the equidistance line.253 The
Court did not heed Cameroons claim of disproportionality and inequity.254
Among the important findings of the Court was that equity itself was not
a method of delimitation, nor did it mean equality.255 However, it should
also be noted that neither of the Parties had islands in the contested area.
4. Evaluation of the Aegean Dispute in Light of the Instructive
International Adjudications
Based on international case law, it is clear that both Parties will have
to compromise on their claims regarding continental shelf delimitation in
the Aegean. The Turkish claimthat all Greek Aegean islands should be
devoid of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone areasis likely
to be extreme and in conflict with international law. The Greek claim
that all islands should create continental shelf areasis likely to lead to
an inequitable solution and might even lead to the nonrecognition of the
arbitral award if a potential tribunal makes a decision favoring this claim.
It should be noted that in all international adjudications, special
circumstances that may make the delimitation disproportionate and
249. Anglo v. French Continental Shelf Case, 18 R.I.A.A.,, ¶ 70.
250. Van Dyke, supra note 53, at 113 n.227.
251. Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nigeria: Eq. Guinea intervening), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 303, ¶ 287 (Oct.
10).
252. Id.¶¶ 287-289, 306.
253. Id.
254. Id.¶¶ 271, 295, 296, 299.
255. Id. ¶ 294.

140

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27:1&2

unequal are examined as the second step, after drawing an equidistance
line. However, it should also be noted that the examination of potential
special circumstances is only a way to ensure that the already drawn
equidistance line does not lead to inequity. Special circumstances
themselves cannot be applied as a method of delimitation.256
The problem in the Aegean is the existence of several Greek islands
on the wrong side. Based on the precedent discussed above, it is possible
to conclude that an arbitral tribunal on the Aegean dispute would adopt the
median line approach with a twist of special circumstances specific to
geographics of the Aegean Sea. Even though Greece claims a strict median
line with all islands and islets having their own continental shelf areas,
pursuant to Article 121 of the UNCLOS, only inhabited islands which can
sustain economic activities have a right to a continental shelf and exclusive
economic zone.257 Moreover, islands closer to the opposite coast have been
accepted to create special circumstances.258 Accordingly, the
commentary to draft Article 7 of the 1953 International Law Commission
report referred specifically to the presence of islands as a possible cause
of special circumstances.259 A potential Tribunal will need to make the
decision about which islands and islets to grant continental shelf areas to
seeing as not all Greek maritime features in the Aegean are inhabited, can
sustain economic life, and hence qualify as islands. It may be an
inequitable solution to grant importance to insignificant geographic
features. The significance of such Greek geographical featues, especially
the ones that are situated on the wrong side, may be one of these special
circumstances. It is also likely that a tribunal will refer to the principle of
non-encroachment while delimiting the Aegean Sea.
Further, a potential tribunal should make remarks to the rule of
proportionality. In order to avoid gross disproportionality, geographic
features, population, and coastal length are likely to be considered. In
2018, Greece was reported to have a population of around eleven million
people while Turkey had around eighty-two million people.260 In 1991, the
total combined population of all inhabited Greek Aegean Islands was
488,480 people, or approximately five percent of the total population of

256. See Kozyris, supra note 87, at 332.
257. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 121.
258. See Brown, supra note 245, at 488.
259. Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its Fifth
Session, [1953] 2 Y.B. Intl L. Commn 200, ¶ 82, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/76.
260. Total Population Data, THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SP.POP.TOTL [https://perma.cc/5S8P-MDEG] (Last visited Sept. 10, 2021).

2022]

DRAWING LINES IN THE AEGEAN

141

Greece.261 It seems as though Turkey stands a better chance if a tribunal
decides to heed the population of the Parties for making a proportionate
decision. Yet, it is more likely that a tribunal will aim to prevent a grossly
disproportionate result rather than seeking ultimate proportionality. Even
though Turkey will have a more favorable result if the ratio of land masses
is considered, it is unlikely that a tribunal will take this into account as a
special circumstance that warrants adjustments to the equidistance line.
Based upon previous international adjudications, it seems unlikely that
ratios of population or land masses between Greece and Turkey will play
a substantial role in the delimitation of continental shelf areas.
In all, Greece has a stronger position when it comes to the geographic
features of the Aegean. First, Greece has sovereignty over 2,000 islands in
the Aegean.262 Second, the Aegean Sea is Greek by three sides and Turkish
by only one side. Greeces coastal length is also longer than Turkeys, with
the Greek Aegean coastline at 3,960 kilometers versus the Turkish at 3,484
kilometers.263 Even after considering all the specific circumstances to the
case, such as the contiguity of several Greek islands to the Turkish coast,
it can be stated with a high level of confidence that Greece should be
entitled to a larger portion of the continental shelf areas in the Aegean. All
inhabited Greek islands and islets capable of sustaining economic life have
the right to continental shelf areas. Greeces legal right has been
acknowledged by customary international law, international adjudications,
and UNCLOS. The only limitation to this right can be asserted in the
eastern Aegean. An island that is on the wrong side of the median line
cannot be declared devoid of a continental shelf. Yet, regarding the
principle of non-encroachment, it will bear an inequitable outcome if
Turkeys access from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea is cut off due to
Greek territorial seas. Because such an outcome will threaten Turkish
navigational freedom and security interests, Turkey should at least be
granted a high seas corridor which will allow Turkish ships to reach the
Black Sea or the Mediterranean without sailing through Greek territorial
waters. In order to achieve this solution, some Greek islands that are
situated on the wrong side, depending on their significance, may be
completely disregarded during delimitation or may be granted a lesser
effect.

261. Commission of the European Communities, Greek Islands in the Aegean Sea, Final
Commission Report, COM (92) 569, at 2-3 (Dec. 23, 1992).
262. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 17.
263. Aurelia A. Georopolus, Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Aegean Sea, 12
FORDHAM INTL L.J. 90, 123 n.260 (1988).
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V. ARBITRATION AS THE MOST PROFOUND METHOD FOR THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE AEGEAN DISPUTE

The Aegean issue has been one of the main disputes between Greece
and Turkey and it often sparks tension in the area. The main reason this
issue remains unsolved today is because the two states have different
approaches to the dispute. While Turkey regards the issue as a diplomatic
problem, Greece regards it as a legal one. Therefore, neither legal nor
diplomatic mechanisms have yielded results. In addition to that, several
issues are asserted by Turkey, but Greece only recognizes the dispute
regarding continental shelf delimitation. The differences in the
Parties approaches and interpretations only serve to complicate matters.
Referral of the dispute to an arbitral tribunal could be the most profound
solution for lasting peace in the area, and equitable principles and
circumstances particular to the dispute can be considered along with
international treaties. In order to understand why arbitration is the most
profound solution for the Aegean Dispute, it is necessary to take a brief
look at the resolution methods that have been attempted so far between
Greece and Turkey.
1. Current Treaties
Starting from the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Greeks and Turks have
been signing agreements regarding entitlement in the Aegean Sea. The
1913 Treaty of London, the Lausanne Treaty, and the Paris Treaty are the
main international agreements touching upon the entitlement rights in the
Aegean Sea. Yet, it is clear that because these agreements are either
ambiguous or insufficient in some provisions, they cannot solve the
Aegean Dispute alone.264
2. Diplomatic Means
Over the years, Greece and Turkey have tried using diplomatic
channels for ending the Aegean conflict. The diplomatic meetings and
negotiations between the Parties became more intense after the continental
shelf crisis broke out. During the crisis, Turkey and Greece exchanged a
total of twenty-one Verbal Notes.265 Through the notes, Greece and Turkey
agreed to meet at the prime ministerial level and emphasized that the
dispute should be resolved peacefully by negotiations and the continental
264. See discussion supra Parts III(A) and III(B).
265. Toppare, supra note 9, at 36.
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shelf dispute could be referred to the International Court of Justice.266 In
May 1975, Greece proposed a draft agreement while the Turkish side
proposed joint exploitation of the Aegean in addition to suggesting other
peaceful dispute settlement methods in case negotiations between the
Parties failed.267 By the end of the meeting, the Parties were only able to
undertake the initial study of drafting an agreement to submit to the
International Court of Justice.268 By the end of that month, Greece and
Turkey agreed upon holding a meeting at the prime ministerial level so as
to craft an agreement for the referral of the dispute to the International
Court of Justice in the Hague.269
Additionally, even though they had both decided to speed up the
process by holding expert meetings, they could not agree on what to
discuss during the meetings.270 Greece wanted to work exclusively on the
drafting of an agreement for sending the dispute to the International Court
of Justice, and Turkey wanted to initiate bilateral negotiations for all of the
Aegean disputes and potentially refer the continental shelf dispute to the
International Court of Justice in the event that bilateral negotiations fail.271
In January and February of 1976, the Parties managed to come together
twice for expert meetings in Bern.272 During these meetings, both Parties
insisted on their claims very stiffly, without leaving room for any
compromise: Turkey rejected any extension of territorial waters and
Greece insisted it was entitled to twelve nautical miles of territorial waters
by international law.273 Turkey requested a continental shelf delimitation
method solely based on the geographic features and special circumstances
of the Aegean, and Greece declared that every Greek island was entitled
to a continental shelf and the delimitation should be based on a median
line between Greek islands and the Turkish mainland.274 In the end, both
of the expert meetings failed to reach any common outcome at all.275
As a solution, Greece referred the dispute to the United Nations
Security Council and the International Court of Justice. In its unilateral
application, Greece asserted two bases for the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice on the matter. First was Article 17 of the
266.
267.
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269.
270.
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275.
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1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, which both
Parties had acceded into with reservations.276 The second claimed basis for
the International Court of Justices jurisdiction was the Joint Communiqué
from May 1975,277 which stated that the Parties agreed that those
problems should be resolved peacefully by means of negotiations and as
regards the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea by the International Court
at The Hague.278
Apart from disagreeing with the merits of the dispute, Turkey claimed
that the Court lacked prima facie jurisdiction.279 Turkey first claimed that
the 1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes was not in
effect.280 Even if it was in effect, Greece had a reservation preventing the
submission of Greek territorial disputes to the Court, and this reservation
could also be enforced by Turkey in regard to Greece pursuant to Article
39 of the General Act.281 Turkey claimed second that the Joint
Communiqué did not allow Greece to unilaterally submit the dispute to the
International Court of Justice, as well as disclaiming that Greeks assertion
that continental shelf dispute was the sole matter.282 The Court decided that
the Turkish reservation was valid, and the Parties had not made any
unconditional commitment for accepting the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice.283 Hence, it became clear that the
International Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction on the Aegean dispute.
3. United Nations Charter
As of today, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs states Greece
advocates that there is no problem in the Aegean between Turkey and
Greece other than the delimitation of the continental shelf which should
be resolved only through recourse to [the International Court of Justice].
This position of Greece namely one problem-one solution does not
reflect the reality at all.284 The Turkish solution to the Aegean Dispute is
276. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), Interim Protection Order, 1976
I.C.J. 3, ¶ 1 (Sept. 11) [hereinafter Interim Protection Order].
277. Id.
278. Toppare, supra note 9, at 39.
279. Id. at 49
280. Id.
281. Id. at 49-50.
282. Id. at 49.
283. Id. at 50-51.
284. Turkeys Views Regarding the Settlement of the Aegean Issues, REPUBLIC OF
TURKEY MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS http://www.mfa.gov.tr/maritime-issues---aegeansea---turkey_s-views-regarding-the-settlement-of-the-aegean-issues.en.mfa
[https://perma.cc/LKG8-VC4J] (last visited Sept. 10, 2021).
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as follows: Turkey does not rule out from the outset any peaceful
settlement method contained in the UN Charter Article 33, including
having recourse, if necessary, to International Court of Justice or other
third-party solutions based on the mutual consent of both countries.285
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter recognizes negotiation,
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means [chosen by
Parties].286 However, Greece emphasizes the legal nature of the dispute
and claims that resort to the International Court of Justice is the only
possible method of resolution.287 Again, Turkey is not a party to UNCLOS.
It would be more likely that the Parties agree on jurisdiction if they were
to jointly choose an international tribunal for the settlement of the Aegean
dispute.
4. Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration
In 1930, Turkey and Greece signed the Treaty of Friendship,
Neutrality, Conciliation, and Arbitration.288 Article 3 of this treaty
provides that parties should submit the disputes between them to
conciliation in case diplomatic means failed to resolve the dispute.289 If
conciliation fails as well, and parties could not agree on recourse to an
arbitral tribunal, they should seek judicial relief.290 It is unlikely that
Greece or Turkey would prefer conciliation for the settlement of the
Aegean dispute. In the Aegean, there are many issues ranging from the
delimitation of several maritime zones to legal entitlement of islands.
Greece and Turkey cannot even agree on what the dispute is in the Aegean.
Therefore, neither of them would prefer conciliation to attempt to resolve
such a compound and complicated issue. A permanently binding decision
on the dispute would also have great effects on both states regarding
sovereignty, natural resource exploitation rights, navigational freedom,
and national security. A binding decision from an arbitral tribunal would
be better suited considering the nature of the dispute.

285. Id.
286. U.N. Charter, art. 33, ¶ 1.
287. Greek-Turkish dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf, supra note 55.
288. Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation, and Arbitration, Greece-Turk., Oct.
30, 1930, 125 L.N.T.S. 9.
289. Id. art. 3.
290. Id.
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5. Arbitration as the Most Profound Method

Greece and Turkey have been adhering to their respective claims and
preferred method of settlement for decades. It has become obvious that
Greece will not agree to resolve the dispute through diplomatic meetings
and Turkey will not consent to the jurisdiction of an international court.
Thus, the most profound method will be recourse to an arbitral tribunal.
As was done in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, Greece and
Turkey can decide to sign an arbitration agreement and agree on an ad hoc
arbitral tribunal. While judges in the International Court of Justice are the
leading experts of international law, being able to appoint law of the sea
experts, or even more specifically continental shelf/territorial waters
delimitation experts, as arbitrators could be a relief to the Parties.
Arbitration may also give the Parties some freedom on determining the
procedure of the proceedings.
Another possible path to arbitration could come from Article 280 of
UNCLOS.291 Pursuant to that article, parties can agree at any time to settle
a dispute between them . . . by any peaceful means of their own choice.292
Article 287 of UNCLOS establishes that a state party to a dispute has
already consented to arbitration if it has not made any declaration
preventing that dispute to be covered by arbitration.293 Greece is a state
party and has made a reservation excluding maritime zone delimitation
disputes from the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for Law of the
Sea,294 but not from an arbitral tribunal established pursuant to Annex VII
of UNCLOS. Article 287(5) of UNCLOS states [i]f the parties to a
dispute have not accepted the same procedure for the settlement of the
dispute, it may be submitted only to arbitration in accordance with Annex
VII, unless the parties otherwise agree.295 Hence, even the drafters of
UNCLOS have agreed that in case parties to a dispute cannot agree on a
certain dispute settlement method, the best way would be arbitration
pursuant to Annex VII of the UNCLOS.
Annex VII of UNCLOS specifies the arbitration procedure. Pursuant
to Article 1 of Annex VII, any party to a dispute may submit the dispute
to the arbitral procedure provided for in this Annex by written notification
addressed to the other party or parties to the dispute.296 Following that,
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
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Article 3 sets out the rules for the establishment of an arbitral tribunal.
Accordingly, the arbitral tribunal will consist of five members.297 Each
party will be allowed to appoint one member, which can also be its
national, out of a list of four potential arbitrators it has submitted to the
United Nations Secretary-General.298 The remaining three members are to
be determined between the parties by an agreement.299 UNCLOS has also
provided parties with a dual support mechanism. Parties can agree and
leave the appointment of the remaining three arbitrators to be made by a
person of a third state.300 If they fail to agree themselves or leave it to a
third state or person, then the President of the International Tribunal for
Law of the Sea is to appoint the remaining three arbitrators. 301
This elaborate mechanism foreseen in UNCLOS may be a relief to
Turkey and Greece. By being a state party to UNCLOS, Greece has
already given consent to an arbitration procedure defined in Annex VII.
Since international arbitration is a dispute settlement method that relies on
the will of the parties, it is possible for Turkey to give consent to an arbitral
tribunal to be established according to the well-defined and supportive
mechanism of Annex VII. The arbitration procedure of Annex VII may be
much faster than drafting a new arbitration agreement and determining all
the procedures, while still entertaining the Parties free will for a dispute
settlement method.
Additionally, as was the case in the Eritrea v. Yemen arbitration,
Greece and Turkey can form an agreement and submit their dispute to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration. Both Turkey and Greece are state parties
to the Permanent Court of Arbitration.302 In the Eritrea v. Yemen
arbitration, it was held that even though Eritrea has never acceded to the
Convention, the Arbitral Tribunal concluded in its Award in the Second
Stage that the Parties arbitration agreement implied Eritreas acceptance
of the application of provisions of the Convention relevant to maritime
delimitation.303 Therefore, even if Greece and Turkey were not state
parties to one of the founding conventions of the Permanent Court of
297. Id. art. 3.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Contracting Parties, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, https://pcacpa.org/en/about/introduction/contracting-parties/ [https://perma.cc/FY84-JENT] (Last
visited Sep. 9, 2021).
303. Contribution of The Permanent Court of Arbitration to the Report of the United
Nations Secretary-General on Oceans and the Law of The Sea, as at 14 June 2019,
PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, at 3.
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Arbitration, they could still decide to resort to arbitration by concluding
an arbitration agreement.
Since UNCLOS came into force in 1994, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration has acted as the registry for thirteen arbitration cases out of
fourteen that arose out of Annex VII of the UNCLOS.304 The Permanent
Court of Arbitration has gained significant experience in dealing with
maritime zone delimitation disputes. As a competent authority that can
settle the Aegean dispute permanently by a binding decision, the
Permanent Court of Arbitration is the most preferable method for settling
the dispute between Greece and Turkey.
VI. MEDIATION BY THE UNITED STATES AND/OR BY NATO
Even though arbitration seems the best way to reach a settlement in
the Aegean dispute, the Parties have not yet reached an arbitration
agreement. If Greece and Turkey cannot agree on an arbitral procedure
for, the best alternative would be mediation by the United States and/or
NATO.
There have been mediation attempts between the Parties before. One
of these attempts was in 1995 when the United States started military-tomilitary talks concerning the Aegean dispute.305 These talks failed due to
the escalation of tension from the Imia Rocks crisis.306 The Imia Rocks
incident, was settled temporarily through mediation by the United
States.307 Though Greece and Turkey were on the brink of war, U.S.
mediation effectively prevented the use of force. The same result can be
achieved for the permanent settlement of the dispute if the U.S. mediates
as a neutral state.
Both the U.S. and NATO share a significant interest in the peaceful
settlement of the Aegean dispute. After the end of the Cold War, NATO
started to form a new identity and objective. A Greek-Turkish dispute
before NATO would be detrimental for the alliance. Greece and Turkey
are both outstanding members of the alliance, and their withdrawal will
have dire effects.308 The continuation of the Aegean dispute is also
detrimental for NATO. Greece and Turkey have been deadlocked allies
304. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, PERMANENT COURT OF
ARBITRATION,
https://pca-cpa.org/en/services/arbitration-services/unclos/
[https://perma.cc/2TKA-L4GZ] (Last visited Sep. 9, 2021).
305. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 32.
306. Id. at 20-21.
307. MIGDALOVITZ, supra note 134.
308. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 19.
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of NATO.309 This creates an internal problem within NATO because the
two states are rarely in support of each other. For example, in 1995, NATO
sought the establishment of a regional NATO headquarters in Greece.310
In response, Turkey moved to block the NATO budget, similar to how
Greece vetoed the funding of a regional NATO headquarters in Turkey.311
The United States is a NATO member, and [t]he United States interests
are those of NATO, writ large.312 Greece and Turkey routinely oppose
each other in virtually all deliberations at NATO. The ongoing dispute
between Greece and Turkey creates a vulnerability in NATOs internal
decision-making process. Accordingly, both NATO and the U.S. will
benefit from the settlement of the Aegean dispute.
The United States has an airbase in Incirlik, Turkey which is near the
Mediterranean Sea and in close proximity to some of the worlds most
conflict prone regions. The United States conducted Operation
PROVIDE COMFORT from Incirlik Airbase during the Gulf War.313
Should Turkish support for the operation falter, the United States
strategy vis-à-vis Iraq would be severely undermined.314 The Incirlik
Airbase was also used during the fight against the Islamic State, and as the
conflicts in the Middle East continue, the Incirlik Airbase, and the Turkish
alliance in general, will benefit the United States. Greece is also an
important ally to the United States and serves as an important location for
U.S. forces to deploy or transit through. Both countries are important to
the United States due to substantial bilateral trade, and both, but
particularly Greece, enjoy substantial political clout in the United
States.315 Because the delimitation of maritime zones and entitlement of
some islands in the Aegean are still disputed, the international community
would also benefit from the resolution of sovereignty issues in the Aegean.
The Aegean Dispute is one of the main obstacles to Turkish accession
into the European Union.316 The European Union is requiring resolution of
the Aegean Dispute as a pre-condition for Turkeys full accession into the
Union.317 Some authors have argued that the European Union could also
309. See Memorandum from CIA, Greek-Turkish Relations: The Deadlocked Allies
(released February 16, 2007) [https://perma.cc/6NY9-QX86] https://www.cia.gov/
readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B00228R000100170005-5.pdf.
310. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 19.
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mediate between Greece and Turkey to settle the Aegean Dispute.318
However, Turkey is not a member of the European Union and has been
losing interest in becoming one. In 1999, Turkey was accepted as a
candidate country for European Union membership.319 Since then, the
process has continued with ups and downs. Considering the Cyprus crisis
and the accession of Cyprus into the European Union, as well as the failure
of the refugee deal, it can be concluded that Turkeys relationship with the
European Union is not at its best. It will yield more efficient results if an
organization, to which both states are parties, mediate between Greece and
Turkey.
The United States and NATO have neutral positions vis-à-vis the
Aegean Dispute. The settlement of the conflict will be for the benefit of
both. Consequently, mediation by the U.S. and/or NATO is another
potential method of dispute settlement in the event that Greece and Turkey
fail to reach an arbitration agreement on the Aegean Dispute.
CONCLUSION
Greece and Turkey, being the only two littoral states of the Aegean
Sea, have had a long and ongoing dispute in the Aegean Sea. As has been
shown, the dispute in the Aegean is comprised of several critical matters.
The tension rose so high at certain times that two NATO allies sent their
military forces to the Aegean. The Parties have tried to end the conflict
through diplomatic channels, appeal to the United Nations Security
Council, and resort to the International Court of Justice. However, none of
their attempts have been successful. The Aegean Dispute has continued
for several decades, and the Parties cannot risk delaying its settlement any
further.
Although Greece claims that the Aegean Dispute is only a legal matter
regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf, Turkey claims that the
delimitation of territorial waters and the continental shelf, in addition to
legal entitlement of some islands, are all outstanding issues. Accordingly,
the most profound method of dispute settlement should be interstate
arbitration. Arbitration will put an end to the dispute with a binding
decision and allow the Parties to exercise autonomy, such as appointing
leading law of the sea experts as arbitrators or deciding on the laws and
procedures to be applied. An arbitral tribunal established by the agreement
of Greece and Turkey will have to render an award paying regard to the
318. Keefer, supra note 18, at 55.
319. Bahar Rumelili, Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders: The Case of GreekTurkish Relations, 45 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 105, 118 (2007).
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principles of equity and fairness, as is done in international adjudications
dealing with maritime zone delimitation.
If an arbitration agreement is not reached, mediation by the U.S.
and/or NATO could also resolve the Aegean Dispute. Both the U.S. and
NATO have a neutral stance in the Aegean Dispute, and they would
benefit from the peaceful settlement of the dispute. In fact, every state
would benefit from resolution of the Aegean Dispute. It would not only
eliminate one hot spot, but would also allow NATO, the most successful
military and political alliance in the history of the world, to once again
effectively support international peace and security.
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